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At ‘Thredbo1’ (1989)
• Continued decline in public transport use 
(especially bus) seen as the ‘norm’
• Strong emphasis on securing better value for 
money (competitive tendering)
• Mixed outcomes of deregulation– growth in 
express coach use since deregulation in 1980, 
decline in most areas since local bus 
deregulation in 1986 (but sharp reduction in 
costs)
• Partial privatisation of buses, rail still in public 
sector
Main aspects of recent change
• Relatively little change in legislation or 
formal structure (apart from Local 
Transport Act 2008)
• Strong growth (until recession) in ridership
• Growth in public spending
• Specific issues in privatisation/
contracting for infrastructure as distinct 
from services
Recent trends in Britain
• Percentage changes in local bus passenger boardings 1999/2000 to
2007/08:
London +61%
English PTEs - 8%
Rest of England +  2%
Scotland +13%
Wales +  4%
• And in rail passenger trips:
London Underground + DLR + 21%
Light rail (excl. DLR) + 63% (new systems)
National Railways (TOCs) + 32%
Higher growth than existing models suggest (London Bus, National
Railways) or lower decline (PTEs)
Trends in public expenditure
• Very rapid growth in recent years in three sectors:
• London (direct support to buses) to £650m in 07/08 
(from effectively zero 99/00)
• Concessionary fares compensation (mainly bus, for 
those 60+) GB total from £570m in 99/00 to £1,039m in 
07/08 (and further growth due to nationwide free travel in 
England from April 08)
• Direct funding to Network Rail (and predecessor), zero in 
99/00; £1,448m in 03/04 and £3,519m in 07/08 (now 
exceeds access payments via  TOCs: central govt. net 
support to franchisees -£469m 03/04 to 07/08) 
• Fairly obvious user benefits and ridership growth from 
first two items - less direct in third case
Specific sectors
• Express coaches: Some growth in ridership 
(poor quality stats.). National Express remains 
dominant, competition mostly from other big 
groups (Stagecoach Megabus, and recently First 
Greyhound)
• Franchised rail services. In general, demand 
growth gives similar real revenue growth, 
enabling lower subsidies/higher premia
• But risks of optimistic bidding, especially ECML 
– GNER, and then NXEC withdrawals (latter on 
£1,400m premium over seven years)
Bus service and fares co-ordination
• Sharp changes following 1985 Act
• Largely impossible to maintain services on 
agreed common headways and even more so 
on fares (e.g.  Maidstone)
• Decline in market shares of travelcards and off-
bus ticketing, although some efforts to retain by 
PTEs. Shift to operator-only cards, and back to 
cash fares
• Indirectly strengthened position of dominant 
operator who could retain travelcard (e.g. West 
Midlands), whereas inter-operator cards seen as 
‘anti-competitive’
Limitations of price competition
• Works well in long-distance market, but in local market 
short-run price elasticity low (~ -0.4) and precise journey 
timings often not pre-planned. Value of extra waiting and 
decision time may offset money saving. Low elasticity 
means that operator loses revenue through lower prices 
(unless high inter-operator cross-elasticity)
• Hence of limited effectiveness in local markets, although 
some sectors more price-sensitive
• Tendency for competition to focus on levels of service, 
especially using small buses, in some cases to deter 
entry
• Low average vehicle loads as a consequence
Later phases of bus competition
• Reduced in many areas, often now a single operator on 
each route and/or in each area
• Consolidation of operators into larger groups
• Improved industry profit margins from  mid 1990s, 
enabling fleet replacement
• Few cases of sustained competition since late 1980s 
(Oxford the main example)
• Periodic outbreaks elsewhere, e.g. Barnstaple area, and 
Northumberland
• Greater quality differentiation, e.g. low floor vehicles, air 
conditioning
• Competition remains in tendered service market (around 
3 bids per contract) but variable
2000 Transport Act
• Introduced ‘Statutory Quality Partnerships’ (SQPs) with 
minimum vehicle quality standards specified for entry 
(and operators not meeting these excluded from relevant 
infrastructure). In practice very few, and most QPs on a 
voluntary, informal, basis
• Quality Contracts (QCs) on similar lines to London 
model, but subject to very restrictive conditions re 
timescale, etc. None introduced.
• Made it easier to use tendered service powers to 
strengthen frequencies over commercial routes
• Main impacts probably through introduction of common 
half-fare concession for 60+ in England
Competition legislation and practice
• Very limited penalties at time of 1985 Act, simply 
requiring unacceptable practices to be stopped
• Penalties introduced through Competition Act 
1998 (although perhaps after the worst 
excesses)
• Initial investigations by the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) with subsequent referral where it 
considers justified to the Competition 
Commission (formerly the Monopolies 
Commission)
• Recent/current cases – Eastbourne and Preston 
mergers, bus industry market inquiry
Local Transport Act 2008
• Royal Assent 26 November 2008, but some powers being 
introduced in stages
• Passenger Transport Authorities (PTAs) renamed as ‘Integrated 
Transport Authorities’ (ITAs) from February 2009 with wider powers 
re transport planning. New ones may be set up (none so far)
• Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) recognised from Feb 
2009, making greater co-ordination in timetabling and ticketing 
between operators and local authorities possible. OFT powers to 
impose fines removed, and clearer ‘competition test’. However, local 
authority cannot prevent use of facilities unless SQP applies.
• Qualifying Agreements (QAs) between two or more commercial 
operators, usually with LA ‘sitting in’ to certify agreement is fair
LTA 2008 (cont)
• Easier conditions for establishment and scope for Quality 
Partnership Schemes (QPSs). Conditions include 
frequencies, timings, and maximum fares, as well as 
vehicle standards under 2000 Act.
• Easier introduction of Quality Contract Schemes (QCSs), 
where benefits would arise. Consultation and review 
before introduction
• ’Passenger champion’ to represent bus users nationally 
(Passenger Focus, extending role from rail)
• Wider scope for community transport services (secs. 19 
and 22 of 1985 Act), but some concerns re fair 
competition by fully-licensed operators.
OFT market inquiry
• In addition to enquiries in specific  cases, OFT has 
powers to examine conduct ‘market studies’ in whole 
sectors. Bus industry study launched March and report 
published August 2009 (since workshop paper written).
• Concerns re outcomes of competition – tendered and 
commercial markets, price levels, service quality, etc.
• Evidence taken from industry, local authorities etc. Some 
analysis of DfT statistics.
• London and Northern Ireland explicitly excluded from 
Terms of Reference – “..no issues of concern” from 
“stakeholders in these two areas” (para 2.2) 
• Still a tendency to review within bus industry competition 
as a ‘good thing’ per se? If so, contradiction re London?
OFT market enquiry (cont)
• Paragraph 3.37:
“….for purposes of this study the relevant markets are the markets
for local bus services in Great Britain (excluding London) and that 
the markets do not include car travel, inter-urban rail services or 
other mass passenger transport systems, taxis, cycling or walking”
• Paragraph 4.39:
“…..to the extent that exclusionary behaviour [by operators] does 
take place it may be exacerbated by the conduct of paying 
passengers…brands generally were not strong and…. customers 
were happy to use rival buses if they arrived at a stop first…”
• So does real behaviour  match competition 
theory? A narrow market definition?
OFT market enquiry (cont)
• Concern re lack of sufficient depots to provide competing 
services in many areas (commercial and/or tendered)
• Scope for entry seen as limited if competitors deterred 
from some routes by exclusionary behaviour (para 4.29)
• Criticism of operators for lack of interest in multi-operator 
ticketing agreements (but no acknowledgement of 
previous OFT role in deterring these, especially prior to 
block exemption)
• Modelling of fares suggests 9% higher levels in areas 
with monopoly provision, sig. at 5% [appendix C] 
(although some problems with data quality)
• If so, what measures appropriate for this? Competition or 
regulation?
The London case
• Further pax growth in last two years, from 
already high per capita base
• KPMG report broadly endorses present 
system of gross cost tendering.
• Some problems:
Issues re direct role of Mayor in setting
fares 
Politicalization of vehicle design. 
Road pricing
• London congestion charging introduced 
February 2003 – broadly successful
• Western extension February 2007, including 
substantial residential areas: to be withdrawn.
• Strong rejection of Edinburgh and Manchester 
schemes in public referenda
• But Nottingham to introduce workplace parking 
levy
• Strong case in principle remains for road pricing, 
but politically now very sensitive
The infrastructure question
• Competitive tendering for services (relatively) 
straightforward - can be divided into 
manageable units, with possibility of alternative 
bidders/substitute operators. Variable timescale
• ‘Privatised’ infrastructure (or long-term private-
sector contracts) – Network Rail, London 
Underground PPP.
• Issue of how one regulates a monopoly supplier 
(NR) or deals with very large contracts (three 
infracos within 30-year PPP)
Infrastructure experience
• Network Rail increasingly funded direct by central government rather 
than via access charges. Total subject to Office of Rail Regulation 
controls. For CP4 (April 2009 - March 2014) ORR determined total 
funding of £28,500m, compared with NR proposal of £31,100m, and 
£29,500m actual in CP3 (April 04 – March 09) [all at 06/07 prices]. 
Main reductions in annual expenditure from 2011/12
• London Underground PPP effective from 2003. Three contracts –
SSL and BCV to Metronet consortium, JNP to TubeLines. Severe 
financial/ managerial problems at Metronet, into administration 2007 
and re-incorporated into TfL/LUL in 2008. TubeLines more 
successful, but some current problems re future cost estimates for 
period 2 from 2010 (reviewed by PPP arbiter) and extent of line 
closures needed for engineering work
Infrastructure options?
• National Railways operations all private 
(franchised TOCs + open access), but London 
Underground train operations still public. Case 
for ‘Stockholm approach’ in London?
• Lack of effective comparators, e.g. could part of 
national system infrastructure be managed 
separately for comparison with NR (Merseyside? 
Scotland?). TubeLines and former Metronet 
operations might serve this role 
Convergence of practice?
• LTA 2008 would enable more effective 
coordination in ticketing systems and service 
headways within deregulated regions, while 
operators retain separate identities and can 
compete (e.g. for tendered work).
• Possibly QCs giving parallels to London case in 
other city
• Possible scope in London for greater 
competition in tendered market?
Or the opposite?
• Broadly similar structure likely to remain in 
London
• Renewed emphasis by OFT on the role of 
competition outside London (albeit 
accepting position within London)  and 
referral to Competition Commission
• Bus operators placed between competing 
pressures.
Public spending constraints
• Strong growth in recent years likely to be 
reversed
• Fairly inflexible commitments to rail (PPP, 
NR budget, Crossrail) and free 
concessionary travel 60+ on buses
• Bus tendered service expenditure more 
flexible – danger of being ‘squeezed’
(social equity implications)
